Technical Debt is a Choice #
(And often the correct choice.)
What engineers mean by “technical debt”
- Poor code quality leading to a brittle codebase
- bad or little to no testing leading to bugs
- spaghetti code due to rapid feature bloat
What CEOs hear: person making 6 figures failing to due their job yet demanding even more resources
IDK who needs to hear this, but:
This is not what is meant by “technical debt.”
Technical debt is what happens when engineering (and executive) leadership chooses to prioritize net new work over maintaining existing projects.
Elle's is a good response. (An earlier draft of this was posted as a thread in response to this conversation. A lot of people found it useful and had interesting comments, so I expanded on it here.)
Few topics show communication dysfunction in software organizations as immediately as discussing Technical Debt.
From the business side of things, it seems like engineers constantly complain about being bad at their jobs, and don't understand the urgency of shipping. From the engineering side, it sucks trying to swim uphill in codebases that are full of aging "temporary" cruft and legacy hacks which eventually make forward motion impossible.
The Deeply Wise thing for senior engineering types to say at this point is that it's just challenging for "business people" to comprehend the nature of software, and so we need to find better ways to advocate for what we need. (Sometimes including "lie to them"; say stuff will take longer than it really will, because that's a great way to build organizational cohesion.)
But that's kinda bullshit. "Business people" are often deeply technical people capable of understanding a lot of really complicated things, and make difficult decisions involving competing interests all the time. (The good ones, anyway.) It's worth considering that perhaps if you can't explain it well enough, maybe it's because you aren't understanding it properly.
"Technical debt" is not a universally bad thing, but a result of a set of chosen trade-offs, which are optimal in a great many situations.
An important concept often missing from these conversations is that "technical debt" is not a universally bad thing, but a result of a set of chosen trade-offs, which are in fact the optimal choice in a great many situations. It only becomes toxic when not clearly chosen or wisely managed.
"Technical debt" is what happens when you prioritize "try lots of stuff" over "invest in elegance/maintainability".
In software development, elegance and maintainability are not free! They have costs, that's why you have to invest in them. Time and attention are valuable limited resources. If you're not sure what you should be building in the first place, why pay extra for it?
During experimentation phases of product design, the best thing to do is quickly scaffold out a bunch of stuff, designing in such a way that it's easy to replace or remove any given piece, but not necessarily so that it's easy to maintain or extend (or even understand). If you do throw something away, any investment in maintainability there is wasted.
The best approach is to only switch modes and build/improve things "for real" once you have adequate product validation. Ie, pay down the debt once you know you're keeping the thing you bought with it. The longer you put off that work, the more the interest stacks up on it.
That investment in maintainability should be done such that the result is easy to keep building throwaway experiments on top of. That is, the point is to take on a lot of technical debt, gain info as fast as possible, and only pay what you need to for the products and features that matter.
Doing this well requires keeping a clear view of which features are still experimental, which of those have been validated and should be reviewed/refactored for maintainability (or have been invalidated and should be discarded), and which are out of that phase and safe to build upon further.
Failure Modes #
I don't feel like any of this is fundamentally very hard for business folks to understand. Even the term itself is a very apt finance metaphor!
But too often engineers (and especially engineering managers) do a poor job of planning and managing this debt, and thus a poor job of communicating the tradeoffs involved, and as a result business managers are poorly informed about their choices.
One surefire way to steer a company towards poor use of technical debt is to reward product management for "shipping" and reward technical leaders for "impact".
Which a LOT of big companies do.
This is made worse, ironically, when you also treat "technical debt" as a horrible problem to be avoided at all costs.
This creates an outsized incentive to oversell the value of features that are not yet validated, and possibly also shut down or remove valuable product features rather than invest in making them cheap to maintain long term.
So you get high level ICs hopping from one experiment to another rather than optimizing the organization and architecture, PMs driving work on features designed for the presenting at the CEO's next conference talk rather than user value, and business leaders wondering why ICs are so grumpy.
Another failure mode (there are countless ways to fail!) is overly investing in maintainability of features that should be experimental (no tech debt! tech debt bad! no touch hot stove again!) This is costly, and increases the likelihood that the company stagnates and fails.
Furthermore, ironically, the "no tech debt!" approach often means hardening things for the long term that should be built for removal or replacement, which means that when they do need to be changed, it's harder to do so! You just increased your tech debt interest rate!
(Healthy software organizations are all alike. Each dysfunctional software organization is dysfunctional in its own way.)
It's Not About Code Quality #
The biggest problem with the take @ElleArmageddon was replying to, is the idea that there exists some platonic ideal of "code quality". The sooner you realize that ALL code is temporary trash destined for the garbage heap of history, the sooner you can start making rational decisions.
There is no such thing as "high quality code" or "low quality code".
There is no such thing as "high quality code" or "low quality code". Erase that idea from your thinking. There is only "software that makes tradeoffs that are profitable in a given situation (and likely not in others)".
The choices that are optimal for "figure out what we should be building by validating features with real world user behavior" are radically different from those for "provide and maintain this feature efficiently at scale for the foreseeable future".
And, it should be said, I'm making it seem like a binary by focusing on two opposite ends of a spectrum here, but it's not either-or. All code is temporary, all features are experimental. The question is how long you want to bet the experiment will run. And there are extremely strong arguments for making some investments in maintainability early on, because they are counterintuitively cheaper to build up front than do without. (For example, writing tests.)
The Shape of a Solution #
This "no such thing as code quality" idea can be really eye-opening. Instead of asking "is this good code?" we should be asking "what tradeoffs is this code making? what situations make this a good choice? what situations make it a poor choice? What situation are we actually in?"
The real "10X engineer" (if there is such a thing) is the person who can perform this kind of analysis, and then identify and plot a course towards a set of tradeoffs that are optimized for the current context.
That is the process we should aspire to as engineers. A clear vision of the appropriate level of commitment and investment in all the features of our product, so that we can make sound decisions about what to rely upon, what to be ready to throw away. When interfacing with the business, we can clearly indicate which features have been hardened, which were slapped together to test a hunch, and so on.
We can start to ask product managers about which things we should throw away, and which we should invest in hardening. We can even preemptively set timelines on when these decisions will be made and what data will drive them. Any product manager worth their spreadsheets who would be thrilled to get this kind of visibility and feedback.
Instead of kvetching about how "The Business" doesn't understand or appreciate the salt of the earth software engineers toiling away in the code mines, or have to suffer wrongheaded questions like "how long will it take to be production-ready?", or fight tooth and nail to justify making everything prohibitively expensive, we can instead educate the entire organization about the trade-offs available, make informed choices together, and get direction that is actually useful in solving the problems before us. (Assuming, of course, we take the time to understand them ourselves.)
By the time you realize you have a problem, it's because you have a big problem.
Like most emergent software problems, of course, it's not so simple. By the time you realize you have a problem, it's because you have a big problem. But digging out of a mess is only a matter of taking small iterative steps towards improvement.
Catalog the components of the system. Identify the parts that are brittle and which of those should be hardened and which should be thrown away. Conceive of the architecture you wish you'd known you'd need, and start taking small steps towards it, while still doing experiments, but with open eyes and a clear criteria and timeline for moving them to non-experimental status.
Bottom line, technical debt is not "created" by engineers writing bad code, or business leaders making impossible demands, and it's not always a bad idea. It's chosen by an organization's collective priorities, and it is often the correct choice, as long as it's acknowledged and managed responsibly.
: there isn't. it's a myth.